Authors: Vojtěch Holzhauser, Karel Lehmert Affiliation: Dept. of Criminology & Forensic Studies, University of Finance and Administration, Karlovy Vary, Czech Republic Keywords: floods, flood-prone areas, legacy materials, Spolana Neratovice, contamination, chlorine, mercury, dioxins
Introduction
In August 2002, during the catastrophic European floods, one of the affected sites was the Spolana chemical plant in Neratovice. The plant had been used for production of chlorine gas via amalgam electrolysis, leaving behind severe mercury soil contamination, as well as production of PCBs, dioxins, and many banned pesticides and herbicides — including 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (TCDD), notable for its extreme environmental persistence. A flood wall constructed to mitigate such concerns proved insufficient.
Methodology
For the purposes of this study, environmental and ecological reports were consulted, including the T. G. Masaryk Water Research Institute report, the State of contamination of agricultural soils after floods in August 2002, articles from the Czech Ministry of the Environment, and the United Nations regional programme report on persistent toxic substances. Local news articles were also used due to the limited availability of academically suitable professional sources.
Results
Damages were estimated at over one billion crowns (over $48 million USD). Main detected contaminants included up to 80 tons of chlorine and lesser quantities of mercury and dioxins being released into the water and atmosphere. The attempts of first responders to mitigate the situation were hindered by the caustic chlorine cloud. The chlorine destroyed crops of farmers in surrounding towns and villages, and trees in the area turned orange, singed and burned by the caustic gas. The Spolana parent company only alerted authorities and the wider public three days after the initial flooding. Despite claims of no imminent danger, the true amount of released contaminants and the scale of contamination remains largely unknown to this day.
Discussion
This incident demonstrates the risks of building chemical plants in flood-prone locations and the need for disposal of legacy materials at the earliest convenience, rather than isolation and storage. It also highlights the need for better preparedness of chemical companies operating in such locations, the necessity of further training for first responders in HAZMAT/CBRNE incidents, and the urgent need for improved crisis communication management by corporate entities.
References
- T. G. Masaryk Water Research Institute et al. (2004). Evaluation of the August 2002 Disastrous Flood. Ministry of Environment of the Czech Republic. https://apps.mzp.cz/web/edice.nsf/E80DF4F3457EE6ABC12570B6004D6EF4/$file/flood_2002.pdf
- Vácha, R. et al. (2003). State of contamination of agricultural soils after floods in August 2002. Plant Soil Environ., pp. 307–313. https://pse.agriculturejournals.cz/pdfs/pse/2003/07/03.pdf
- United Nations Environment Programme (2002). Regionally based assessment of persistent toxic substances. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/487281?v=pdf
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